Xi Wraps His Agenda in a Dead Man's Legacy as China's Storm Clouds Gather

Politics117 articles covering this story· 2026-08-17

Xi Wraps His Agenda in a Dead Man's Legacy as China's Storm Clouds Gather

Jiang ZeminChinaXi JinpingBeijingChinese Communist PartyPresident of the People's Republic of China
Xi Wraps His Agenda in a Dead Man's Legacy as China's Storm Clouds Gather
"Beijing, Tiananmen Square, Great Hall of the People" by Arian Zwegers is licensed under CC BY 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.

There is a particular kind of political theater that authoritarian systems have perfected over the centuries: the living leader who drapes himself in the mantle of the dead one, borrowing legitimacy he can no longer generate on his own. Xi Jinping performed that ritual with precision on Monday, speaking at a state ceremony marking the centenary of former Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin's birth and using the occasion to tie Jiang's record directly to his own present-tense agenda.

The speech was not a eulogy. It was a policy statement with a corpse as a prop.

Xi invoked what he called the imperative to stay "committed" to the Party's leadership in the face of "high winds and rough waters" — a phrase that, in the coded grammar of Chinese Communist Party communications, signals serious acknowledged difficulty. The leadership does not deploy maritime storm metaphors when things are going well. That the phrase appeared in a birthday commemoration for a predecessor, rather than in a routine policy address, is itself a signal worth reading carefully.

Jiang Zemin, who died in November 2022, presided over China during a period of extraordinary economic expansion — the years of WTO accession, export manufacturing boom, and a broadly optimistic integration with the global economic order. His legacy carries a specific ideological charge: growth-first pragmatism, selective opening, and a posture toward the West that was competitive but not yet confrontational in the way Xi's China has become. By linking his own agenda to that period, Xi is essentially arguing continuity where critics see rupture.

The continuity argument matters domestically because Xi is governing through a genuinely difficult economic moment. Property sector debt remains a structural drag, youth unemployment has run at levels the government found embarrassing enough to briefly stop publishing the data, and foreign direct investment has declined sharply from its peak years. The reform-era glow of the Jiang period — when the Chinese middle class expanded at a pace that felt almost miraculous — is exactly the kind of borrowed light a leader needs when the present is generating friction rather than momentum.

Internationally, the ceremony served a parallel purpose. Jiang's tenure included the normalization of China's place in multilateral institutions, the handover of Hong Kong, and a period when Beijing was genuinely courted by Western capitals. Xi has been reframing China's global ambitions through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and explicit calls to reform what Chinese officials describe as a Western-dominated international order. By invoking Jiang as a forefather of "expanding international influence," Xi is constructing a genealogy that makes his more aggressive posture look like organic evolution rather than ideological departure.

That reframing requires some historical compression. Jiang's China and Xi's China operate in fundamentally different environments — different in terms of domestic political tolerance, different in terms of the Party's relationship to private capital, and different in terms of how Washington and Brussels have calibrated their responses to Beijing. The world that made Jiang's record possible no longer exists, and the ceremony on Monday did nothing to reckon with that gap.

What the event did accomplish, in pure political mechanics, is something Xi has been doing with increasing regularity: using the Party's own history as a constraint on internal dissent. If Jiang's legacy endorses the current direction — and the state has now said, formally, that it does — then questioning that direction becomes, implicitly, a challenge to a revered predecessor. It is an elegant trap. The dead cannot object, and the living who might object now have to argue not just against Xi but against the constructed memory of a leader many Party veterans genuinely respected.

The "high winds and rough waters" framing is the detail that should not be lost in the pageantry. Xi is not governing a China that is confidently ascending on every front. He is governing one that faces simultaneous structural economic pressure, intensifying technological competition with the United States, a complicated neighborhood that includes a hot war on the European continent with knock-on effects for Chinese diplomatic positioning, and a domestic population whose expectations were shaped by decades of near-continuous improvement in living standards. Invoking a dead leader's centenary to steady the ship is what you do when the ship needs steadying. The ceremony was, in that sense, more honest about the moment than most of what comes out of Beijing's official communications. Read it that way, and the subtext is plain: the rough waters are real, and the leadership knows it.

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